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Introduction 
A key part of the work of the FE Commissioner and his advisers is in undertaking 
Structure and Prospects Appraisals (SPAs) on colleges (and potentially local 
authority adult education services) which have been identified as ‘failing’.   SPAs 
commissioned in these instances are bespoke to each situation, taking careful 
account of the local environment, the underlying reasons for failure, and the steps 
which need to be in place to safeguard quality provision for learners.  In an 
increasing number of cases, support is required from other providers to achieve this 
– frequently through a permanent structural relationship. 
Structural relationships operated to date within the sector include mergers, 
federations, and joint ventures/partnership arrangements, some of which are well-
established, others of which are very new.  Some of these earlier arrangements are 
between colleges; others are between colleges and other bodies.  The rationale 
behind decisions to change structural relationships is wide and varied, with some 
arising from necessity, or from an evolution of existing arrangements.  Others have 
been in response to strategic drivers and opportunities.  In every case, the primary 
objective should be to meet the needs of learners and employers. 
To conduct an increasing volume of SPAs authoritatively and successfully, all FE 
advisers need a good working knowledge of successful and well-established models 
which are capable of replication elsewhere in the sector, and how the potential 
benefits relate to the evaluation criteria set out in New Challenges, New Chances. 
This work has been commissioned to increase the level of understanding within the 
FE Adviser group about the circumstances in which the common models used in the 
FE sector work effectively, and an analysis of why they do so. 
The report is structured in two sections – the first of which looks at the current 
models used in the Sector, and a second which details the practical findings 
arising from a series of visits undertaken by FE Advisers.  The five key 
conclusions from the visits undertaken in Section 2 are reproduced here ease 
of reference.  They are: 
• There is no one ‘right’ structural model for colleges to adopt, and there 
are many examples of successful mergers, federations and other forms of 
collaboration which counter some of the well-publicised failures.  A rigorous 
and objective analysis following Structure and Prospects Appraisal’ process 
will enable a college to thoroughly evaluate strengths, weaknesses and local 
circumstances.  Time taken to do this thoroughly and objectively helps avoid 
issues later on.  We would advise that regular review, following the principles 
of the Structure and Prospects methodology should feature in the strategic 
planning of all providers – with decisive action taken about future structures 
before fundamental problems become too advanced to address.  
 
• The sector has a history of larger, potentially stronger, colleges merging 
with smaller weaker colleges.  The lack of central financial support for debt 
clearance and staff restructuring, the current policy of an early Ofsted 
inspection, and a focus by many colleges towards on local and sub-regional 
needs makes this a much less attractive option in future. 
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• Governors have a critical role to play in key decisions about structure 
and in the interests of their college and its learners; they need to be as 
objective as possible.  The choice of leader should take account of the skills 
and attributes needed to run the new organisation, and should not 
automatically confined to consideration of internal candidates.  As reductions 
in public funding bite harder, it is sensible to assume that the need for senior 
leaders with financial and commercial acumen increases. 
 
• Our views concur with the advice from the evaluations undertaken to date 
(and outlined in Section 1) – the success of a model is in the detail of its 
implementation. Once a decision to change has been made, the 
implementation process should be undertaken as quickly as possible.  
However, this stage needs to be well-planned, carefully executed, rigorously 
monitored, and underpinned by timely and accurate data about performance 
from Day 1.  Following the technical merger, leaders need to be highly visible 
to their new teams, focused on delivering the planned benefits, and should 
avoid external distractions which do not have a direct impact on the institution 
and its performance. 
 
• Our assessment of success suggest that new collaborations and new 
structures, where the decision to change has been subject to rigorous 
assessment and careful implementation, can create valuable economies of 
scale, protect and improve student access and progression, and address 
issues of poor quality.  There is much good practice in the sector about how 
to ensure that these important features are realised, and a willingness by 
those visited and consulted during the course of this work to share their views 
and experiences with others.  
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Methodology 
The methodology adopted comprised four elements: 
1 Undertaking desk research on the range of different organisational structures 
currently in use. 
2 Consultation with key sector stakeholder groups – to check the range of models 
currently in use in the sector, to identify current constraints, and to discuss the list 
of organisations to be approached for visits. 
3 Consultation with the Devolved Administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland and 
Wales, with visits to sector colleges where appropriate 
4 Undertaking a programme of visits to institutions to discuss the drivers for 
change, implementation, and the lessons learned of relevance to the wider 
sector. 
 
The initial work has focused on examining the wealth of documentation available on 
structures (which includes individual merger/federation submissions and 
consultations, policy documentation produced by the Devolved Administrations, and 
studies which evaluated the benefits of new structures). The work was supplemented 
by conversations with policy makers and key sector stakeholders (a full list of which 
is contained in the Appendix). 
Policy makers and sector stakeholders raised a number of other organisations 
which they thought would be helpful for advisers to contact.  These included a 
sample of four private providers, two local authority adult education service 
providers, and two HE/FE partnerships.  Telephone discussions were arranged with 
these organisations. 
The FE Adviser Team involved in this Project selected a range of colleges to visit 
during the period December 2014 and January 2015.  These visits focused on 
‘established’ structures, in order to evaluate the longer-term impact of change – and 
their relevance to addressing current sector issues of access, quality and financial 
sustainability.  The sample was chosen to ensure as far as possible a broad 
geographical spread of institutions, and different types of collaboration and 
partnership. Institutions known to be in difficulties (financial or quality) were not 
included in the visits programme.  The key questions used to prompt discussions are 
included in the Appendix. 
The report is structured into two main sections, each of which has its own summary 
of key conclusions. 
• Section 1 explains the established structures now operating in post-16 
education and training, and reviews the formal written evidence available 
about their impact. 
• Section 2 focuses on the views expressed during visits to institutions, and 
those of other practitioners and contributors contacted by telephone. 
 
The short Appendix lists the organisations contributing to this Report and the key 
evaluative questions.  There is also an analysis of how overall success rates over the 
past 3 years have changed in the institutions visited (against national averages) and 
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provides a potted history of the dates and processes relevant to the merged 
institutions visited. 
SECTION 1 - AN EXPLANATION OF THE CURRENT MODEL 
This section explains the major structures currently used in post-16 education and 
training – broadly grouped as full mergers and federations – which may be relevant 
in developing option models for Structure and Prospects Appraisals.  
1 Mergers in post-16 education 
 
Mergers in English further education have been relatively commonplace since 1993, 
at which time there were 492 general FE, sixth form and specialist colleges offering 
post-16 education funded by the then FEFC.  Currently, there are 336 colleges - 216 
General Further Education Colleges, 93 sixth form colleges and 27 specialist 
institutions1 .  These have included mergers between FE colleges, FE colleges with 
sixth form colleges, and occasionally FE colleges with HE providers. 
From a review of a range of merger submissions and proposals generated by 
colleges over the years2, there are normally one of two key reasons put forward for 
mergers: 
• Establishing strategic advantage (the ‘building competitive edge’ 
merger).  The justifications put forward for creating larger colleges are about 
having greater local influence with LEPs decision-makers and funders, the 
potential to bring in more additional income (with the ability to resource a 
specialist team for competitive bidding), quality improvement, and more 
influence in work with employers (from being in a position to offer a full-
service model across sectors sub-sectors and levels).  They may also plan to 
exploit economies of scale, including through the creation of shared services.  
The increased scale of operation is often argued as providing better career 
opportunities for existing staff, broader professional development, and to 
enable the employment of specialist teachers. With students, there are 
generally plans to offer a wider choice of provision, including some niche 
programmes, with volume of delivery making progression from Level 1 
through to HE more cost-effective.   
 
• As a solution to solving the problem of a failing college (the rescue 
merger) – where another successful provider takes them over.  In the 
past, such mergers have often been supported financially by the funding 
agencies, but in England this is no longer the case unless there are 
exceptional circumstances.  
 
Mergers in the English FE sector are referred to as ‘Model A’ (double dissolution - 
where both corporations dissolve and form a new College, with a new name), or 
‘Model B’ (single dissolution where one corporation – normally, but not inevitably the 
smaller weaker one3 - dissolves and passes its assets/liabilities to the other). The 
new Corporation typically consists of members drawn from both original college 
boards (with a strong bias to the more dominant party).  Either way, the trend in most 
1 AoC August 2014 
2 The FEFC and LSC required colleges to structure their proposals against a set of criteria which included explaining 
the potential benefits of merger in respect of range of provision, access, quality improvement and value for money. 3 Occasionally this has been done for purposes of speed 
 6 
                                            
   
cases has been to retain the distinctive name of the ‘dissolved’ college for local 
branding purposes, and to avoid any public use of the term ‘acquisition’. 
‘Freedoms and Flexibilities’ was introduced in 2011.  Under New Challenges, New 
Chances and reinforced under the subsequent paper ‘Rigour and Responsiveness’ in 
2013, any College Governing Body considering a major structural change is 
expected to conduct a Structure and Prospects Appraisal - rigorously assessing all 
options and adopting an open and transparent process in the identification and 
selection of both a preferred model and potential partner/s.  The process involves 
wide consultation with stakeholders including funding agencies, local authorities, 
other providers and, in most cases, MPs. 
Should merger be the answer then, under the Education Act (2011), colleges are no 
longer required to obtain the Secretary of State’s formal approval and the decision 
rests with the Governing Bodies concerned.  However, the Secretary of State’s 
approval is needed for both the creation and naming of any new FE College (formed 
should both colleges dissolve).  Either way, colleges are expected to consult widely 
on their proposals and to respond to issues raised during the Consultation process.   
2 The evaluation of mergers 
Various studies evaluated the potential benefits and ultimate success of mergers in 
the further education since the late 1990s. Research and evaluation on the success 
of mergers is inevitably backward looking and for the FE sector in more recent years 
(i.e., after 2010), rather thin on the ground.     
The LSC commissioned a ‘rapid review’ of the research in 20074, which summarised 
the wide-ranging bank of evidence available at that time.  The report suggested that 
in many mergers, there was some evidence to suggest benefits in relation to student 
choice and progression, results, brand image, and financial strength.  Harmonisation 
of systems, of staff terms and conditions and keeping control of costs were identified 
as significant issues for newly-merged colleges.  Factors underpinning successful 
mergers and partnerships included clarity of roles, strong leadership, clarity of 
vision, strategy and objectives, similarity of (positive) attitude between the two 
merging colleges, and the importance of the leadership team being people-
focused.  These are judged to be important factors to consider in any proposals put 
forward by potential partners.   A later document, published by LSN5, reinforces 
many of these factors. 
KPMG6 has researched whether larger college size improved value for money - 
meaning lower unit costs and better results – they concluded that there were 
elements of truth in this – larger colleges tended to have lower unit costs; Ofsted 
grades tended to be higher (but not success rates).  
The Higher Education sector, which has also undergone very significant structural 
change, offers valuable parallels with the Further Education sector.  Research in 
20107 concluded many of the same potential benefits as in FE, but emphasised 
4 Collaborations and Mergers: Rapid Review of Research on Collaborations and Mergers between Further Education 
Providers, Leeds Metropolitan University, 2007 
5 Understanding FE Mergers and Making Them Work, LSN (2010) 
6 Delivering Value for Money through Infrastructural Change (May 2010) commissioned by the Learning and Skills 
Council. 
7 Oakleigh Consulting (2010) 
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issues of implementation much more strongly.  There is often great excitement about 
vision and culture.  It was suggested that ‘grounded’ issues such as absolute realism 
about the costs of merger, and caution about the time taken to achieve change and 
produce the intended benefits needed greater attention.  The HE research concludes 
that most mergers fail, or fail to live up to expectations because of poorly managed 
post-deal integration (absence of planning, poor strategy and management, a lack of 
open communication and clear vision, and a range of people/cultural issues).     
Variables which can affect whether or not a merger works (and which need careful 
identification in the planning process) include whether a merger is voluntary or 
involuntary, a consolidation or a takeover, single or cross-sector (FE/HE mergers 
have been shown to have their particular problems), two-partner or multi-partner, and 
between partners with similar or differing ‘academic profiles’.  
South Africa went through major restructuring of its HE following the end of Apartheid 
– reducing 36 to 21 HE institutions (and with the creation of 2 new institutions).  
Lessons learned included the importance of rapid decision-making to make the new 
institution secure and irreversible, minimising ‘staff flight’, and building higher levels 
of trust through face-to-face contact.  As trust improved staff recognised the need for 
a common vision, a simple management structure with clear accountability, 
participative budget processes and performance management. 
3 Federations 
‘Federation’ is a broad term used in post-16 education to cover a range of formal 
structures and collaborations short of merger.   Federation has the potential to allow 
significant autonomy for those involved, but formally commits to collaboration in 
specified areas.    Typically these are introduced as structures to address one or 
more of the following: 
• Full management of provision (what we term here ‘management federations’) 
• cost reduction (which might apply through sharing services) 
• increased influence (particularly for a group of colleges across a sub-region) 
• increased capacity for income generation (joint bidding using the expertise of 
both) 
• improving progression 
• joint delivery 
• rapid quality improvement 
 
Whilst the type, format, and underpinning legal structure of a federation is 
infinitely flexible, federations focusing on rapid quality improvement or joint 
management are not used extensively in the sector at the present time, 
possibly because of two critical factors: 
Where colleges have overlapping catchments, or compete directly with each other in 
other respects, it is difficult to build the necessary trust and confidence to ensure that 
this type of federation is successful. 
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A second, equally significant barrier to the creation of federations is ‘ring-fenced’ 
accountability.  Governors’ responsibilities8, the College principal’s ‘accounting 
officer’ role, UKPRN9 numbers, measurement of success rates as a key performance 
indicator, minimum standards, financial health and institutionally-based Ofsted 
grades - all conspire to push colleges to focus on their own success and 
performance. This College-focused accountability inevitably acts against wide-
ranging innovative partnership and delivery arrangements.   
Federation structures are used in four main ways: 
• Within a merged college (to enable individual units to focus on their core 
business). 
• Federations short of merger with a single Principal/Chief Executive and senior 
staff manage two colleges. 
• Federations where two or more colleges agree to set up a joint company with 
a joint Board for a specific purpose (usually comprising the Chairs and 
principals of the colleges involved). 
• Federations where the role of Chief Executive is separated from that of 
Principal – and the College sits under the umbrella of a Charitable Trust.  The 
Trust takes on schools, training providers and other organisations as distinct 
parts of its business (for example, TEN in Norfolk), and each Principal, Head 
Teacher or Managing Director reports to the Chief Executive. 
 
2a The federation structure within a merged college ‘group’ – with a single 
governing body and a single legal entity: 
In practice, some aspects of the federation model have been adopted by larger (often 
merged) colleges working in locations with different needs (for example, Newcastle 
College Group, Hull College Group). The individual colleges within the Group work to 
agreed targets, but are expected to meet local needs in a flexible and responsive 
manner. 
As a single entity, with one funding allocation from each of its core funders, a large 
merged college can allocate resources freely across its separate components.  
However, for inspection purposes it will receive a single set of grades – an issue 
which can cause significant internal tensions. They argue that a single grade may 
reduce ‘transparency’ to the public, employers and other stakeholders.  
Overall accountability sits within the Chief Executive, with contracts and service-level 
agreements underpinning accountabilities and responsibilities for individual colleges.  
These agreements will include the separate college activities, their targets, the 
methodology to be used for resource distribution, required performance standards 
and intervention processes.  Governance, quality assurance and improvement 
services sit within the College Group, together with shared services.  Site-based 
college ‘principals’ generally sit on the Group senior leadership team, together with 
Group Directors and the Group Chief Executive. 
 
 
8 Sections 18-19 of the Further and Higher Education Act (1992).   
9 UK Provider Registration Number 
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The model of federation within a merged College is illustrated diagrammatically 
below: 
 
In theory, the benefit of a federation structure within a merged college lies in the 
ability of the individual colleges within the Group to maintain a local culture and 
presence, and respond directly to local needs.  At the same time, they are able to call 
on the professional services and support of the Group. The Group and the Governing 
Body retain absolute control.  They act as the commissioning body with funding 
agencies, and allocate resources (including investment capital) between college units 
according to both performance and need. 
 
2b ‘Management’ federations with a broad remit short of merger 
There are two typical models: 
• This is where a single Principal/Chief Executive and a small central 
team are shared across two or more colleges (for example, South 
Leicestershire College/North Warwickshire and Hinckley College, and 
Kingston College/Carshalton College). 
•  
In these examples, each institution retains its own governing body, and with legal 
contracts/service level agreements approved by both which set out the federation’s 
powers. The agreement also sets out how the federation can be terminated.    
In the case of Kingston/Carshalton College, the services of the Principal, 
leadership of quality improvement and corporate services, and a full range of college-
based shared services are provided through the Kingston and Sutton Educational 
Partnership Limited.  With North Warwickshire and Hinckley College and South 
Leicestershire College, the senior team have proportional contracts across the two 
colleges.  Leadership of two colleges involves a substantially-increased workload for 
senior staff, mainly around the need to service two governing bodies and the 
Federation Board. 
Within these federations, each of which has a site principal/senior lead, the individual 
colleges do not have directly over-lapping catchments.  They have strengths in 
different areas of curriculum provision, and make their decisions independently 
through their own governing bodies.  Financial reporting, capital investment and KPIs 
are entirely separate.  There are two UKPRNs, two ILRs, two Ofsted reports, and 
performance is recorded separately in league tables.  The main advantages have 
Chief Executive and 
Central Group 
Directors 
College A - site 
Principal 
College B - site 
Principal 
MD of wholly-owned 
subsidiary company 
MD of Jointly-owned 
shared services (if 
not part of the 
Group services) 
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been in planning and sharing quality improvement strategies, identifying the 
curriculum to be offered, and in creating economies of scale through shared services.    
This type of collaboration may work well where both colleges are thriving but it may 
not be appropriate where one or more colleges in the Federation under-perform and 
ultimately need either financial support or a substantial ‘rescue’ package – involving 
other Member colleges.  It also works well where the colleges are closely located, but 
not in direct competition. 
2c Other types of federation retain two Principals/Chief Executives, and 
work through a joint venture company structure to deliver the services and 
commitments identified within the formal, legal contract.   Typically these are 
for: 
i Delivery of provision  
Such a federation might provide a ‘shop window’ for employer-facing work through 
the creation of a company, limited by guarantee.  This model allows for direct 
employment (for example, on different terms and conditions to the owning college).  
It also allows for secondments from the owning colleges or elsewhere.   Company 
trading activities are likely to attract VAT as colleges’ exemption from VAT is rooted 
in the powers of the Further and Higher Education Act (1992).  If the company 
intends to receive public funding for education and training activities in its own right, 
then it may be necessary for the company to register independently in its own right. 
ii Cost-cutting 
Driven by the need to cut costs, and preserve ‘front office’ services, new models are 
emerging which focus initially on shared services (typically, seeking to combine 
transaction processing, HR, procurement, student administration, estate 
maintenance, and IT support).   In 2010, HM Treasury provided £15 million funding 
for college shared services work. 
In contrast to mergers, there is quite a bit of work which evaluates barriers to 
introducing shared services.  In 2011, the AoC10 commissioned an evaluation of 
shared services projects introduced through the Efficiency and Innovation Fund.   
Their conclusions about the barriers were broadly similar to those identified in the HE 
work, but included a lack of clarity of objectives, a need for trust, the dangers of 
inadvertently passing control to external consultants, the challenges of harmonising 
multiple colleges’ tried, tested and trusted systems, and under-estimating the time, 
practical investment and the level of engagement (including governors and senior 
managers) needed. 
The benefits of producing a ‘local’ solution to cost reduction via shared services may 
initially prove attractive to colleges.   Common delivery service specifications can be 
developed using best practice, and may enable ‘member’ colleges to choose the 
services they wish to subscribe to from a menu.  Whilst a reduction in support staff 
jobs is inevitable, those jobs that remain are retained in the local area, and local 
colleges retain their independence of mission, identity and reputation.  There may be 
opportunities to bring in additional partners over time (voluntary and community 
sector organizations, schools, or other colleges), and with only minor adjustments to 
the processes agreed by the original partner colleges.    
10 Research and Evaluation of Shared Services Projects, Centrifuge Consulting for the AoC 2011 
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One downside is the level of investment needed to create a common data platform 
and to harmonise procedures and processes across two colleges.  Early studies 
have shown that, with good management, it may be possible to reduce the costs of 
back office functions by up to 20% over a 3-year period.  If savings exceed targets, 
then there is the potential to re-invest or distribute funds to foundation partners.  Staff 
contracts and terms can be designed with incentives to encourage further savings. 
With shared services (HEFCE funded about 35 shared services projects), there were 
4 main reasons why some projects were less successful – a lack of institutional 
appetite (not always outwardly expressed), lack of market awareness, changing 
circumstances and lack of rigorous feasibility/viability at the outset.  Failure of 
projects tended to occur where sharing was limited, where the work was driven by a 
group of enthusiasts but without more widespread support, where a leading 
individual ‘moves on’, where there is too much delegation from SMT, a lack of 
professional advice, and where the business case is insufficiently quantitative. 
[Shared services in HE, KPMG, 2006] 
The barriers to achieving successful collaboration in these circumstances are 
significant.  A model where two or more colleges combine their back office teams into 
a single service raises issues of accountability and performance measures, culture 
change in how services are delivered and managed to maximize value at minimal 
cost, shared funding of any up-front investment (for example in MIS), and 
standardisation of delivery specifications.  Depending on the model adopted (which 
could range from an unincorporated shared services organization through to a 
company structure), there may be technical barriers including TUPE transfers, 
redundancy arrangements, and OJEU procurement rules).  One key long-term issue, 
VAT, was partly resolved under the Finance Act (2012) which now allows exemption 
from VAT for ‘cost-sharing groups’. 
At a later stage, and assuming that early collaboration is successful at reducing 
costs, and at building trust and confidence in managers and corporation members 
about joint working, then the remit could expand to cover other aspects, for example 
- quality improvement services, joint curriculum planning and core curriculum 
specialization, joint advice, guidance and support, bidding, and estates management. 
Iii Increasing influence 
Some colleges have a successful history of working in formal regional structures (FE 
Sussex) often through the creation of a joint venture company, limited by guarantee.  
Companies have often evolved to provide services to their ‘members’ including joint 
bidding, joint lobbying, and shared delivery.  Regular reports on activities and 
progress (together with annual report and accounts) are provided to all members. 
School federations, where heads lead more than one school, and one governing 
body oversees the work accordingly are well established.  Work by Ofsted in 201111, 
identifies hard federations (one governing body, one executive head teacher) as 
opposed to ‘soft federations’ with two governing bodies, shared committees and one 
head teacher.  At the time of producing their report, Ofsted indicated that there were 
600+ schools operating under one or other of these arrangements.  Federations in 
11 Leadership of more than one school, Ofsted 2011 
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schools are brought about under three main ‘conditions’ – a failing school, a school in 
danger of closer because of size, and cross-phase federations – improving transition.  
Ofsted’s report indicates that the overwhelming push to federate is pragmatism or 
economic necessity.  Good leadership in federations means improving teaching, 
adopting consistent best practice in monitoring teaching and learning, improving 
behaviour, monitoring student progress and rigorous performance management of 
teaching staff.  Compared to FE, school head teachers in these circumstances can 
become very ‘hands on’.  The report highlights good practice in identifying strengths 
within failing or weaker schools and ensuring that these ideas are adopted within the 
stronger school. Effective leadership and management was highlighted as the single 
most important contributory factor to improvement.   One of the biggest barriers 
which needed to be overcome was concerns by parents, pupils and staff. 
Conclusions: 
A review of the available documentation and literature which looks at mergers, 
federations and shared services highlights 5 major points: 
1. In FE, some studies have shown that benefits from merger (student choice, 
progression, realising financial efficiencies and improving quality/success 
rates) are achievable.  Strong leadership (of the overall strategy and the 
people involved), compatible culture and clarity of roles and vision are 
fundamental to success. 
 
2. Federations are quick to establish and may avoid many of the common 
pitfalls of mergers (for example, harmonisation of culture and pay).  However, 
they are not suitable in all circumstances, and can create enormous 
pressures on leaders (for senior staff running two colleges), and additional 
bureaucracy.  The ‘voluntary’ nature of many federations makes it difficult to 
enforce financial efficiencies at an early stage.  Single college accountability 
is also a fundamental principle which affects federation structures. 
 
3. Shared services has been a visible part of the FE structural landscape for 
some time.  Independent shared services (ie, not used as part of a wider 
‘management’ federation) have proved challenging to establish and to run – 
largely because of the need for high levels of commitment and trust, and a 
willingness to compromise on systems. 
 
4. In higher education, where much more work has been done on evaluating 
mergers, failures arise from over-optimism about timescales and costs, and 
what they term as ‘poorly managed’ post-deal integration. The research has 
also identified a range of variables which can adversely affect the likelihood of 
success, namely whether a merger is entered in to voluntarily, regarded as a 
takeover, involves merger from organisations across different sub-sectors or 
brings together multiple partners. 
 
5. Federations in schools, with an executive head-teacher working across more 
than one school, have one governing body which aligns them more closely to 
a merged college than to the federation model adopted in FE.  They are often 
effective in improving quality, or helping in smooth transition between phases 
of education.  As in FE/HE models, effective leadership and management is 
highlighted as the single most important contributory factor. 
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SECTION 2 - EVIDENCE FROM VISITS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH THE 
SECTOR 
This second section draws together the views and reflections of a range of 
consultees (policy makers, sector stakeholders), and current practitioners about 
structures in FE - the drivers of change, good practice in the process of decision-
making and implementation, and how the intended benefits of structural change can 
be realised in practice.  In is presented in five sub-sections: 
1 The Drivers of Structural Change 
2 The Decision about the Type of Structural Change Needed 
3 Implementing Successful Structural Change 
4 Benefits and issues 
5 Conclusions 
 
1 The Drivers of Structural Change 
 
In practice, there have been five main drivers of structural change in colleges, all of 
which remain current and relevant in the context of the sector going forward.   
These are: 
a. Larger colleges seeking to grow  
b. Smaller colleges concerned in either the short-term or the longer-term about 
viability 
c. Financially-sound colleges, seeking to reduce overheads in the face of the 
current outlook for public funding 
d. Pressure from powerful and influential stakeholders 
e. Board influence, driving a particular mission and focus 
 
(a) Larger colleges seeking to grow 
Many of the larger colleges visited (including Newcastle College Group, Birmingham 
Metropolitan College, and Cornwall College) have grown extensively by acquiring 
others – through seeing an opportunity and making an approach, by invitation from a 
key stakeholder or funding body, or by a direct request from the organisation 
concerned.   
Past motivation for acquisition has been driven by the likelihood of public funding 
support (in the case of a failing college) to help with the costs, the prospect of 
negotiating new capital funds as part of any ‘deal’, and policy incentives to expand 
particular types of provision, for example work-based learning.  Merger has also 
helped some larger colleges build strong specialist areas of provision.  During our 
visits, principals stressed the benefits achieved in building economies of scale, and in 
generating funds for investment in new buildings, infrastructure and specialist staffing 
posts. 
However, in the light of cuts and constraints on public funds, our discussions with 
larger colleges and federations indicated a much more cautious approach to further 
growth by acquisition, and in particular a current lack of attraction in taking on a 
poorly-performing provider. They are seeking structures which allow them to have 
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legal subsidiaries within an overarching ‘holding’ entity but which allows them to 
allocate resources across the group, spread risk and more easily access employer 
funded learning opportunities.   Many have reviewed their own missions to focus on 
regional or sub-regional priorities and to align themselves with the expected further 
devolution of power to the English Regions, LEPs and through City Deals/Growth 
Deals. They are rejecting ideas or offers which are not aligned to their core purpose.   
A number have now developed clear criteria against which any new opportunity 
would be evaluated.   
These criteria are focused on issues such as: 
• What is the purpose of the organisation seeking help, and how well does it fit 
with our own mission? 
• Could an acquisition or other form of partnership help improve provision, and 
meet learners’ needs better? 
• Is the organisation potentially financially sustainable once joint back office 
services and any other changes to reduce costs have been factored in? 
• Is there sufficient management capacity to do this, and what is the 
opportunity cost of this when compared with other strategy initiatives? 
• What is the added value to our own organisation’s mission and strategy?   
 
(b) Smaller colleges concerned about future viability 
Discussions highlighted two distinct categories: 
I Those taking early action 
Smaller successful colleges, with good financial health and good Ofsted 
ratings but which, having undertaken their own analysis, decide that they are not 
financially sustainable into the medium term.  
This is particularly the case for colleges which have been heavily dependent on the 
Adult Skills Budget, where colleges see significant additional competition from new 
free schools, sixth forms, academies and the private sector, or where there is a clear 
demographic downturn in the forecast numbers of young people within their 
catchment.  Such colleges are also worried about future funds for capital investment. 
For example, many recognise the need to radically improve MIS, maintain their 
buildings, invest further in core IT infrastructure, and replace teaching resources in 
capital-intensive areas such as STEM).    Many of the same features were apparent 
to Carshalton College when it invited proposals from neighbouring colleges in 2010, 
finally creating a Federation structure with Kingston College in 2011.  The rationale 
for change and choice of partner in these circumstances is underpinned by a 
thorough analysis – either a strategic options review, or more recently a Structure 
and Prospects Appraisal. 
A further factor driving rather more defensive action is new college competition.  The 
presence of a large competitor on the doorstep changes local dynamics.  A 
successful small college with a turnover of £15 million may well revisit its own 
strategic plans if a neighbouring failing institution is taken over by a provider with a 
turnover of £60+ million. 
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Local authority adult education provision is classified as a non-statutory service.  Most 
providers are very heavily dependent on Adult Skills Budget funding.  In many cases, local 
authorities are reviewing options to see how to continue to provide services through structural 
change – through modelling up to 100% subcontracting, through merger of services with 
other local authorities, or through forming a community enterprise company.  In November 
2012, Suffolk County Council agreed to the formation of Realise Futures as a company 
offering non-statutory services formerly run directly by the Council.  The company offers three 
strands, adult learning services, employment services, and careers advice. 
ii Those slow to take action 
The second category of smaller college is those which are already failing.  In 
most cases, our consultees, and principals of colleges visited spoke about weak 
colleges in denial – having received poor inspection results or subject to close 
monitoring and potential intervention by a Funding Agency.  
The tendency of senior managers and Boards in these cases was often to ignore the 
issues, present future plans for change and growth with little substance or evidence, 
and be driven by internal criteria (retaining independence, autonomy, positions of 
status and staff jobs).  Without external intervention, there is a danger that potential 
suitors and partners are shortlisted for their ability to deliver these four criteria rather 
than by considering the bigger question of “how high-quality provision for students 
might best be provided in our area in a cost-effective manner”. 
 (c) Financially-sound colleges seeking to reduce overheads 
Some forward-thinking colleges, who have every intention of remaining independent, 
see advantages in finding ways of reducing overheads by adopting shared services.  
Whilst it is clear from Section 1 that this is by no means an easy option, in a minority 
of cases, collaboration between colleges has been successful and extensive.  It can 
include a limited range of back office administration, or be developed as a ‘full 
service’ model.  For example, Wessex Educational Shared Services, which is based 
on two-college collaboration, was driven by a wish to maintain student-centred 
investment and cut back-office costs. 
(d) Pressure from powerful and influential stakeholders 
The three Devolved Administrations (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) have 
taken a direct approach with their constituent colleges. They have encouraged 
mergers – to reduce costs, and maintain provision in isolated geographical areas 
where, on a standalone basis there are concerns that independent provision would 
not prove viable. In Wales, most of these have been between FE colleges, but there 
have also been cross-phase mergers, involving smaller HE providers and FE 
colleges.  The Devolved Administrations generally regard the quality of provision 
offered in colleges as good or better, and do not see quality improvement as a 
primary objective of consolidation.  
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Scotland In November 2012, the post-16 Education (Scotland) Bill included 
provisions to restructure Scottish FE colleges into 13 ‘college regions’ with the object 
of achieving better financial stability in the face of revenue funding cuts.   
Wales In 2008, there were 25 Further Education Institutes in Wales.  There are now 
13, with two community-based FE institutions.  Transforming Education and Training 
Provision in Wales (2008) was the start of a process of rationalisation – based on the 
principles that unnecessary duplication of provision, small class sizes, too many 
educational buildings, and loose partnership arrangements, were not delivering the 
Government’s agenda for change.  The Welsh Government is keen to maintain 
choice of provision and opportunities for progression, but geography, transport and 
low population density are long-term challenges.  The arguments put forward for 
change were that rationalisation would help strengthen strategic management, 
improve efficiency, maintain provision in rural areas, and build stronger financial 
resilience.  
Northern Ireland Their FE colleges were incorporated in 1998, and remain classified 
as ‘public sector’.  Since 2004, there has been a major programme of rationalisation, 
reducing an initial 16 colleges to 6. All but one merged institution has dispersed 
campuses over an extended geographical area. The rationale for merger was – too 
many small and inefficient colleges, the importance of swift and consistent 
communication from the Centre to colleges, and a wish to reform colleges to focus 
strongly on economic development, social cohesion, skills and lifelong learning.  The 
NI Government believes that small stand-alone colleges would have struggled to 
deliver this agenda.   
The very recent timescale of these radical structural changes within the Devolved 
Administrations in Wales and Scotland makes it too soon, in some cases, to 
determine whether the expected benefits have been realised.   
Within the English system, larger colleges are acutely aware of matching their 
geographical focus and curriculum strengths to those needed by Local Enterprise 
Partnerships (LEPs) and by City Deal and Local Growth Deal boundaries.  These 
factors will directly affect future decisions about mission, focus and curriculum offer, 
and structural changes will be made and implemented as a result. 
Occasionally, direct intervention from Government and the Funding Agencies has 
driven structural change (for example in approaching high-performing Reigate 
College to take on Coulsdon College which had failed its Ofsted inspection).  
However, Reigate College governors, in considering the possibilities identified that it 
was both a sensible strategic move, and that the management team of their own 
college had the capability and capacity to make a difference.   
 (e) Driving a particular mission or focus 
Strong Boards (which include principals as members) with clear views about where 
college priorities should lie have been the major factor driving structural change in 
some colleges.  At Eastleigh College, Board-driven expectations that students should 
be gaining jobs rather than qualifications resulted in both cultural and structural 
change to rapidly expand work with employers – at the time, more than doubling the 
income of the college and focusing on high-quality sub-contracting, and setting up a 
separate unit of the College to commission and quality assure the work.   
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In Norwich, driving up standards in local schools and strengthening progression 
through post-16 and into HE for local and regional learners resulted in the creation of 
the TEN Group. Bromley College and in North Warwickshire and Hinckley College 
have created multi-academy trusts – responding to local and community needs. 
Points made by private sector consultees about drivers of structural change: 
“Scale will be absolutely critical to the future – otherwise you can’t build in efficiencies.  FE 
colleges will have to collaborate much more on e-learning, teaching materials and focus on 
what they do best.  This will inevitably affect structures.” 
“Federations, which retain separate management teams, have the potential to focus on local 
provision and local needs, but they cannot deal so quickly and decisively with issues of costs.  
We may not see so many of these in future.” 
“Successful providers are close to their core employment sectors, and structure themselves in 
ways which enable them to do this well.” 
“All too often sub-contracting is used because colleges cannot fulfil their contracts – which is 
high-risk.  Successful sub-contracting is about strategic rationale and developing the 
infrastructure to minimise the risks inherent in not delivering provision yourself.” 
2 The decision about the type of structural change needed 
There are five important factors arising from our discussions with stakeholders and 
providers about the decision-making and approvals processes underpinning their 
structural change.  These are: 
a) Clarity and realism about expected outcomes 
b) Vested interests 
c) Rigorous analysis of options, benefits and risks 
d) Strong, sustained leadership 
e) Governance structures 
 
a) Clarity and realism about process and outcomes 
 
Our discussions raised the importance of all parties identifying what they wanted 
from any collaboration or merger – and then being unequivocally clear with others 
about the evidence base, issues which were non-negotiable (and why), what they 
would or could bring to the ‘table’ to benefit another partner, and what they would be 
prepared to relinquish. 
Shared service federations in particular often started out with a large group of 
potential partners round the table, many of whom faded away once realities of what 
was proposed set in.  One provider was clear that factors such as an individual 
change of principal, unwillingness to devote the necessary management time, a lack 
of appetite to deliver the cultural changes required, or an inability to compromise – 
were the main reasons for individual colleges (generally smaller colleges who might 
have benefited disproportionately from shared services) withdrawing at the planning 
stage.  Unless the commitment and expectations of each potential partner are tested 
rigorously at the outset, there is a danger that change becomes a slow and 
expensive process. 
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b) Vested interests 
 
Many of our contributors commented on the amount of time and money which has 
been wasted historically by the sector over the years on aborted mergers or other 
abandoned structural plans.   
The key issues were: 
• Unresolvable arguments and irreconcilable differences between principals 
and Board members of two or more colleges about power, status and control. 
• The dangers of plans made on emotions rather than on facts and figures. 
• A lack of commitment by senior managers 
• Over-reliance on personal relationships and ‘liking’ or ‘disliking’ individuals 
based within the other party. 
• Misleading or absent data – particularly about known shortfalls in meeting 
critical KPIs (such as funding, student numbers or quality indicators) which 
were subsequently unearthed at the stage of due diligence and proved to be 
‘deal-breakers’ at a late stage.   Late stage ‘deal breakers’ were not just about 
misrepresented facts; they undermined confidence that a compatible and 
respectful relationship between the parties would work. 
 
c) Rigorous consideration of options 
There are some good examples of very thorough analysis of options when colleges 
are considering merger or federation (Barnet and Southgate College, South 
Gloucestershire College, Kingston and Carshalton) – with the decision to seek 
merger or federation based on a sound rationale. Where there has been history of 
successful joint working with the proposed partner, there is a greater level of 
confidence that formal binding structures are likely to work. 
These examples followed the principles and practice of the Structure and Prospects 
Appraisal process (even though many had been completed prior to the official 2011 
guidance) and covered a detailed analysis of the College’s existing position, a range 
of future scenarios, and how any structural change might assure better viability and 
enable local delivery to be maintained and enhanced.   In the best examples of early 
practice, there was extensive consultation with local stakeholders and rigorous 
analysis of student travel patterns by age, level and key subject of study. 
Many of the reviews undertaken by single colleges have pointed to merger or 
occasionally to federation, on the basis that: 
• Other forms of long-term collaboration were difficult to achieve where the 
preferred partner was in direct competition, particularly in relation to 
geography. 
• Where the two colleges have different strengths, strong leadership enables 
rapid and effective exchange of good practice.  In one example “We knew we 
had poor systems but a great student-centred culture. Our proposed partner 
had very strong systems and strong compliance.  We both acknowledged this 
straightaway and made rapid progress as a result.” 
 
In many cases, federation is considered not to be attractive where a College is 
forecasting financial losses.  In the words of one college “what’s needed is something 
faster and harsher - merger enabled us to support a smaller campus year-on-year as 
performance fluctuated”.  And from another, “federations also need real enthusiasm 
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from both parties, or either they won’t work or they won’t make progress fast 
enough.” 
Larger colleges outlined three particular risks which might prevent them merging with 
weaker colleges in future: 
• One was the prospect of an early Ofsted inspection and the potential risks to 
the whole college if the acquisition was a weak partner. 
• A second was concerns about the size of the college entity with a single 
UKPRN, and how this defines the scope of funding allocations, performance 
measures and Ofsted’s inspection boundaries.  By way of example, as 
colleges become larger and more complex, serving markets with multiple 
needs, larger colleges recognise that it becomes more difficult to sustain 
‘outstanding’ as an overall inspection grade, although many parts of the 
business of a large college might be graded ‘outstanding’ if they had been 
subject to their own inspection.  
• The lack of financial support available – particularly in clearing any public 
debt from a failing college, and an expectation that the stronger college would 
cover the full costs of approval, implementation and restructuring, and debt 
repayment. 
 
d) High-quality leadership prior to any decision 
High-quality leadership at the planning and decision-making stage comprises several 
key features: 
• Clarity on the purpose of the change, and an ability to reinforce the purpose 
constantly across all internal and external communications. 
• An appetite to learn from the mistakes of others who have gone down the 
same path, and to share good practice in, for example, legal structures to 
avoid re-invention.  Legal costs were highlighted as the major cost at this 
stage, often running into six figures. 
• Rapid identification of ‘enablers’ and ‘blockers’ – particularly in relation to 
people. 
• Working openly to resolve emerging issues, and barriers to progress, 
however tiresome and detailed. 
• Working with influential stakeholders (LEP, local authority, employers, and 
funders) to secure their active support. 
• Building confidence from within the community. Many providers commented 
on the importance of helping community stakeholders understand that 
changes in structure were focused on keeping, not losing, their local 
provision. 
• Using every opportunity to speak with staff face-to-face.  In the words of one 
provider “Help people see what you are trying to achieve.  Staff start from a 
presumption that merger is bad – tell people early and assure them that in 
any role changes, you will follow a fair selection process.  If merger is not on 
the agenda – then say so.”   
• Appointment of an experienced Project Manager, who kept the activities and 
decisions on track, and who planned in the key decision points (for example, 
making sure Board meetings were scheduled and synchronized at key 
approval stages). 
• Leading the college to the right conclusion required senior staff and 
governors, in particular, to reflect on issues such as their own self-interest, 
the quality of the numerical evidence, key risks, whether credible alternatives 
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had been properly discussed and assessed, whether those with dissenting 
voices had had their opinions heard, and whether any ultimate decision might 
be overly-influenced by memories of past success. 
 
Many colleges used consultants to provide an objective analysis of options and to 
provide a formal report to governors.  However, in general this was considered a 
well-established consultancy ‘market’ with significant price competition.  For those 
collaborations exploring the feasibility of new models, legal costs, were identified as 
the biggest area of expenditure. 
Scotland   Most colleges completed the technical merger within a very short window of 18 
months and a reduction in numbers from 41 institutions down to 16.  The ‘approvals’ process 
required the production of a merger business plan (following Scottish Government 
guidelines), approval by each College Board, and then sign-off by the Cabinet Secretary for 
Education and Lifelong Learning.  In some cases, a great deal of ‘behind the scenes’ 
discussions were needed to ensure approval at Board level. 
(e) Governance structures 
Merged colleges typically organise their governance with a main Board, supported by 
either local ‘Councils’ (campus-focused) or ‘Advisory Committees’ (sector-focused).  
Several of our visits involved conversations about this issue.  
In agreeing constitutional issues and membership, if councils and committees are to 
be effective, they need a clear remit, with selection of members against clear criteria.  
Governance of federations typically consists of multiple boards.  One principal and 
senior team managing two colleges may find themselves attending two sets of 
Corporation Boards, together with a third Federation Board (involving senior 
governors from both member colleges).  In these, the issues for one set of governors 
consulted during this work was the enormous workloads of senior staff, and the time 
spent in the preparation of high-quality Board papers.   
Federations established for more specific purposes, where individual principals 
retained autonomy over day-to-day management of their own institution but 
collaborated on specific issues, typically adopted a ‘management Board’ structure, 
with representation from each member organisation, and regular reports provided for 
approval by each College Corporation. 
3 Implementing successful structural change 
 
(a) Values 
Values were described as emerging in many forms – but were primarily categorized 
as either for moral purpose (e.g., based on ensuring students achieved their full 
potential) or behavioural (expecting staff and students to adhere to a particular set of 
behaviours).    Either way, strong values, articulated, debated and communicated by 
governors, principals and senior leaders at a very early stage in the process, helps 
people take decisions and measure their performance against what the new 
institution or structure expected. 
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(b) Choice of leader and the leadership team 
Whilst there is a tendency for Boards to appoint their senior staff from the pool of 
internal candidates, many sector consultees reflected on the clear advantages about 
appointing a candidate who did not have a legacy in any of the member colleges, 
particularly when merger was involved. 
Public and private sector representatives were both very keen to emphasise the 
different skills and attributes required by successful leaders of large and complex 
organisations and the pole position of the Board in selecting them.  Crucial for the 
future are: 
• Many more Principals and Chief Executives with strong commercial and 
financial acumen, who have a keen understanding of finance and cash flow, 
and who are prepared to see their bank as a key stakeholder (not just the 
province of the Finance Director).   
• Principals and Chief Executives able to work through others and develop a 
skilled and cohesive management team.  Many sector consultees discussed 
the problem of a single strong personality leading a College – effective 
perhaps in small teams, but less appropriate for complex, devolved structures 
which cannot function by reliance on one strong individual.  Providers 
reflected that the transition from one to the other is not always easy for 
leaders to make. 
• Senior management teams willing to adopt a much more rigorous approach 
to business planning with activities carefully classified to ‘invest’, ‘maintain’, 
and ‘reduce’, closely aligned to financial planning.  This needed to be 
accompanied by rigorous forward planning and scenario building to manage 
the future rather than the present. 
• A relentless focus on quality of provision.  Implementation is crucial, but is 
largely an internal matter – and it is not about developing the core business of 
the College.  If so much time is taken up in meetings and working parties 
concerned with structure, then quality suffers. 
• A willingness to engage directly at Chief Executive level with employers – 
leading their colleges in discussions with employers about new opportunities. 
• Data management – with colleges appointing at ‘director’ level and fully 
engaged as a member of the Senior Management team. 
• Estates strategies which reduce overheads, and which do not compromise 
flexibility. 
• A sharply focused mission.  Successful organisations do not attempt to do 
everything, they are very clear about the ‘business’ they are in and the 
‘business’ they are not in. 
• Innovation and change underpinned by clear business planning processes 
which demonstrate value to the organisation and include a rigorous analysis 
of risk. 
 
c) Governance 
There are two potential models of approaching governance.  In the words of one 
college - ‘Either you let governors have real responsibilities, or you let the senior 
team run governance for them’.  In weaker colleges, it was considered that there is a 
lack of serious challenge, and a willingness, by governors to accept the principal’s 
assurances that all is fundamentally well.    
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Selection against an in-depth skills analysis is now regarded as normal practice, but 
the skills needed to run a complex federated or merged structure are regarded as 
different. Those with significant experience of the sector wanted to see more high-
calibre current business leaders joining boards, and fewer governors whose 
experiences lay in the past.  Many recognised the value of governors being paid for 
their services (and also held to account should the College not succeed).   
d) The implementation plan 
College principals emphasised the need for detailed work streams (in the case of 
merger this would structure, finance, curriculum, estates, HR, IT, student services, 
marketing and communications) – led by senior staff who were aligned to the new 
culture and values and who reported in to a Steering Group, comprised of the 
Principal/s and governors.  In many cases, change was led internally, with use of 
consultants for specific roles (HR and TUPE support, writing core documents).  The 
costs of implementation, particularly legal costs, but also those of financial due 
diligence, were identified as major, often running into six figures. 
Policies and procedures are regarded as incredibly important in larger institutions or 
in shared services structures, where people must operate remotely, or without 
immediate recourse to a manager. In poorly-integrated collaborations, people 
operate on either the wrong procedures, or old procedures, which in a heightened 
regulatory framework, becomes a key risk. 
Those with significant experience of mergers pointed to the importance of middle 
managers and their influence on staff.  Despite assurances to the contrary, most staff 
identify one organisation as the dominant party in the ‘mergeover’, retain this 
emotional attachment, and build their response to change accordingly. To ensure 
mergers succeeded, the advice was to progress the new structure and to make key 
appointments as quickly as possible, and ensure that day-to-day management of 
students and curriculum did not suffer as a consequence. 
Federations are much quicker to implement than mergers. Issues of single culture, 
harmonisation of pay, terms and conditions – which are difficult and time-consuming 
to achieve in merged colleges - are often not critical to meet the objectives of other 
types of collaboration. 
Scotland Colleges meet some of the costs of implementing any individual mergers, but the 
process is supported by access to substantial funds to support severance (up to £8 million 
per merger in certain circumstances) and access to an experienced merger team to help with 
technical and management issues, including HR matters. There have been substantial 
changes to governance, with the Cabinet Secretary appointing each College Chair, and 
formally approving Board Member appointments.  All Board members, regardless of their 
previous service, have been required to formally apply and be interviewed for their roles.  
Assessment has been against a skills matrix, but Colleges are expected to ensure that 
Boards take full account of Equalities legislation, particularly in relation to gender balance. 
Wales Each merger was allocated some support funding (up to £650,000) but the Welsh 
Government considers that the real benefit was enabling them to exert strong influence as a 
stakeholder – some mergers may well have progressed without support funding.  Governance 
has been changed to focus strongly on the skills governors bring to their role.   
 
Local authority merged adult education service “We underestimated the time it would take 
around negotiations to avoid problems later on.  After the decision was taken, we still had to 
agree liability for any redundancy costs, agreement on property transfers and licenses, 
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novation of the contract, liability for professional costs and start-up funds, and clarity over EU 
procurement and competitive re-tendering rules.” 
4 Benefits and issues 
Providers talked freely about the benefits of merger, although many were keen to 
point out that, without a ‘control’ group, it was difficult to identify the extent to which 
success rates or quality grades might have improved had another path of 
collaboration been ultimately chosen. 
Former local authority – now a community interest company.   Adult learning enrolments 
have grown by 22%, and formal inspection has graded us as ‘good’.  More ideas have been 
generated; we are taking decisions much more quickly.  Staff have greater ownership of 
targets, and by outsourcing, we now have responsive services at a lower cost.  
a) Cost reduction 
Merged colleges and shared services federations talked about a reduction in income 
derived from public funds, but acknowledged an ability over a medium-term 
timescale (for example 5 years) to take out a higher proportion of costs (in some 
cases as much as 50% more).  In a specific example, a newly merged college was 
able to save £2.5 million in management and support staffing costs at the cost of £1 
million, without a reduction in quality of provision, and another reported making 
savings of 5% in the first few months following merger without loss of services to 
students.  A hard head was needed to deal with avoiding harmonising terms and 
conditions upwards without some gains in productivity to compensate.  
Harmonisation was considered one of the key difficulties faced by merged colleges 
(in contrast to those which federated). 
Most acknowledged that this period of creating savings through reducing overheads 
and restructuring management had now ended, and that the next round of budget 
reductions would be much more challenging, with provision scaled back in line with 
affordability.  In the next phase of cost reduction work, governor involvement and 
support on the principles to be followed was regarded as critical – and those with 
commercial and financial acumen will be particularly highly valued.  Most colleges 
expect to implement a rigorous process of identifying what they need to lose based 
on agreed criteria (applications, enrolment, success rates, progression, employer 
engagement, £ cost per hour, class size). 
b) Investment in the curriculum and in MIS 
Successful merged colleges, in particular, spoke about their ability to invest in sub-
sectors of value to the sub-regional and regional economy (for example, Cornwall 
College – land-based and marine), Hull College (Centre for Digital and Green 
Energy).  At South Gloucestershire and Stroud College investment in new areas 
(engineering, performing arts and sport) has arrested a decline in the numbers of 16-
18 year olds, and complementary strengths has enabled rapid improvement over the 
merged college as a whole.   At Bromley College, realising economies of scale has 
enabled investment in new 14-16 college facilities, a new hospitality suite and a new 
dedicated area for students with complex and multiple learning difficulties and 
disabilities.  Hull College has invested £0.5 million in its new 14-16 Centre.  
Newcastle College Group funded a sixth form centre, largely from reserves. 
 
 24 
   
In most cases, investment in accommodation and facilities had been considerable, 
with one college reporting £120 million invested in accommodation since 
incorporation, with only £15 million drawn down in loans.  Another identified the 
ability to invest £23 million of surpluses into a new Sixth Form Centre.  A newly-
merged college has invested £7 million in the acquired smaller college which, had 
the route to independence or federation been pursued, simply would not have 
happened. Looking forward, many colleges expressed serious worries about estates 
matters – difficulties of servicing loans, running costs of buildings with poor utilization 
or poor fitness-for-purpose, and the need for the sector to use sale/lease back 
arrangements where necessary. 
Their ability to resource a team with dedicated employer engagement skills “starting 
from a point of how working with the College can help an employer’s own objectives, 
rather than ‘this is our offer, do you want it?’ 
Merged colleges emphasised the importance of accurate data from Day 1, and many 
had made significant investments in MIS systems and communication infrastructure 
to achieve this.  Colleges establishing shared services have invested heavily in 
systems.  However, funding support, many would not have been able to progress 
their plans. 
c) Influence 
 
Merged colleges in particular focused on their position as the key stakeholder for 
post-16 education and skills.  Many believe that this placed them in a stronger 
position to take a primary role in their LEP, to lead on bids for external funds (to 
agencies for capital, but also for European funds and regional/sector specific funding 
opportunities).  Size also enabled greater influence with local authorities and has 
helped larger colleges take on positions of sponsorship of Academies, Free Schools, 
and Education Trusts.  One ‘downside’ mentioned by some was the added media 
attention from being the largest or sole provider in a particular area and the need to 
‘tool up’ with media expertise accordingly. 
A second strand is influence with students, parents and the community.  As the major 
sub-regional provider of vocational training, Hull College has been able to introduce a 
‘progression passport’ for its highest-performing students.  The power to ‘brand’ this 
across the whole of the City, employers and neighbouring catchments was 
considered to be very effective in raising the status of the College and understanding 
of the award. 
Influence can also be regarded negatively.  Merged colleges were not always 
considered quick to appreciate the position of schools and other providers, who 
frequently label larger merged colleges as ‘predatory’ ‘untrustworthy’ ‘threatening’ 
and too keen to take the leadership role in partnership initiatives at any cost.  Good 
leadership and good communication can be highly effective in minimising negative 
perceptions of this type.  One college which recognises this is promoting the concept 
of ‘this is a locally focused college working under a single management team’. 
d) Maintaining provision in a breadth of locations 
Merged colleges, who maintained a commitment through their mission and strategy 
to access - considered that without their size and scale, and a consequent ability to 
cope with fluctuations in annual performance, local provision based in isolated 
communities and rural areas would have closed.  Former independent colleges in 
 25 
   
these locations had survived because they were the sole post-16 provider.  In the 
present funding context, they would have become unviable. 
However, powerful Boards of merged colleges have some difficult decisions ahead of 
them.  In the absence of an ability to make further cuts to overheads, further cuts to 
provision, and site closures are likely to form the next step in maintaining viability. 
e) Improving progression 
Collaborations which improved progression to HE offer described the value of this as 
helping raise aspirations, focus students on outcomes at all ages 14+.  While many 
colleges have informal partnerships, franchise agreements, and other short-term 
contractual arrangements with HE providers, colleges engaged with these 
partnerships felt that the added certainty of a formal binding structure gave greater 
importance and momentum to their plans.  There are many examples of good 
practice, but three contrasting examples are: 
In Scotland, where Forth Valley College markets its provision based on destination 
outcomes, and achieves about 95% positive destinations (to relevant jobs and 
relevant high-level FE and HE provision).  Their merger eight years ago had given 
them an ability to plan curriculum strategically, with specialist HE at Levels 4 and 5 
(in STEM, creative arts and tourism, and business) on each of its 3 sites – each 
addressing local employers’ requirements.  
In Plymouth, the College of Art and Design supported a specialist Arts Free School 
(for ages 4-16) which, in conjunction with their own offer, had given seamless 
progression through school to postgraduate level for those with the talent and 
commitment to succeed.  The ability to influence the curriculum pre-16 has helped 
build much stronger FE and HE niche provision which leads to quality jobs in the 
Creative Industries.   
Aylesbury College’s joint venture company with the Buckinghamshire New University 
has given the College the ability to sponsor a new UTC, develop higher 
apprenticeships, completely review the FE curriculum offer at Level 3 (with an eye to 
progression) and has enabled the partners to develop an HE facility in Aylesbury, in 
a building funded by District Council, and leased to the JV. 
f) Quality 
In discussions with providers, driving up improvements in success rates are not 
always a key issue in the decision to merge or to federate.  However, in our 
discussions with institutions, the pace of improvement is generally in line with 
national averages (see Appendix, where we have modelled the changes in success 
rates of colleges visited over the most recent three-year period against national 
averages).  In some cases there have been dramatic improvements – for example at 
Coulsdon College, and at Kingston/Carshalton (which in 2011 had success rates of 
78% and 76% respectively). The recent inspection of South Leicestershire College 
(now ‘good’) and very positive grades and comments about Coulsdon College, 
suggests that Federations involving the right match of partner/s can make rapid 
strides in improving quality.  
The quality and relevance of the curriculum in many cases has been improved, with 
better opportunities for work experience and ‘on the job’ training. 
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Ofsted, within our sample of colleges which have merged or federated, have judged 
overall effectiveness in each case to be at least ‘good’. 
Importantly, principals viewed well-led large institutions to be in a better position to 
tackle pockets of poor provision quickly and decisively – deploying specialist  teams, 
or employing credible consultants (including ex-inspectors) to advise on how to 
address fundamental issues of quality.  An ability to invest in strong MIS, with live 
data available, appropriately packaged, at all levels from lecturers through to 
governors was critical to identifying problems early.   The expense of introducing and 
maintaining very strong MIS was considered to be much easier in structures with size 
and scale. 
Northern Ireland In evaluating the success of mergers, the NI Government reports that 
success rates have improved, levels of investment in data, skills and staffing is much 
stronger, and leadership has been ‘refreshed’ with the appointment of some new principals.   
Scotland The Scottish Funding Council expects the structural reforms to generate about £50 
million savings each year from 2015/16 – but acknowledges the substantial costs of 
development £54 million.  Scottish FE colleges are now classified as part of the public sector.  
They must conform to public sector accounting requirements (which include holding minimal 
cash balances, reporting to a 31 March year-end date, and gifting any surpluses to an Arms 
Length Foundation - to which they may be able to subsequently apply for capital funds).  The 
Scottish Government intends to monitor the effect of these changes (finances, savings and 
access to learning). The Scottish Funding Council will share the lessons from completed 
mergers and focus colleges on ‘outcomes’ which contribute to national priorities.   
g) Addressing bureaucracy and hierarchy 
All colleges and partnerships which we visited indicated that they kept a watchful eye 
on bureaucracy and the inevitability of increased costs as a result.  They presented 
the following examples of what they sought to avoid: 
• We are careful to structure our service-level agreements to avoid them 
getting in the way of an instant response to a problem.  There is a danger that 
staff are seen as too remote and insufficiently aware of our issues and 
timescales.  [shared services] 
 
• We are making some use of IT for videoconferencing and SKYPE, to avoid 
travelling between sites for key meetings.  Further investment in systems will 
be critical to retaining responsiveness.  [merged college] 
 
• A relentless focus on communication is essential.  It is not just the messages 
which are important – it is the style of delivery.  We have found that building 
consistency in style, particularly for face-to-face briefings undertaken further 
down the organisation, avoids miscommunication of the core messages. 
 
• The number of meetings has grown considerably.  This affects both members 
of the senior team and governors.  Complex federations and structures, which 
involve meetings of single college governors, meetings of governors from all 
colleges involved, and then possibly additional meetings of Academies and 
Trusts is very time-consuming for everyone.  [federation/s] 
 
• In resolving differences and difficulties, we must have a ‘corporate’ position.  
This means we punch up in private (although this means we have some very 
long meetings), but then agree a corporate position and communicate it – 
hard for some.  [federation] 
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• Shared services can be seen as remote and faceless.  We have had to work 
hard to address this – both in terms of physical location, but also by 
structuring staff in college ‘teams’, so that they know the individuals, the 
culture and the requirements of their ‘core’ college well.  This does not stop 
them working flexibly within the full service when needed. 
 
5 Conclusions 
• There is no one ‘right’ structural model for colleges to adopt, and there 
are many examples of successful mergers, federations and other forms of 
collaboration which counter some of the well-publicised failures.  A rigorous 
and objective analysis following Structure and Prospects Appraisal’ process 
will enable a college to thoroughly evaluate strengths, weaknesses and local 
circumstances.  Time taken to do this thoroughly and objectively helps avoid 
issues later on.  We would advise that regular review, following the principles 
of the Structure and Prospects methodology should feature in the strategic 
planning of all providers – with decisive action taken about future structures 
before fundamental problems become too advanced to address.  
 
• The sector has a history of larger, potentially stronger, colleges merging 
with smaller weaker colleges.  The lack of central financial support for debt 
clearance and staff restructuring, the current policy of an early Ofsted 
inspection, and a focus by many colleges towards on local and sub-regional 
needs makes this a much less attractive option in future. 
 
• Governors have a critical role to play in key decisions about structure 
and in the interests of their college and its learners; they need to be as 
objective as possible.  The choice of leader should take account of the skills 
and attributes needed to run the new organisation, and should not 
automatically confined to consideration of internal candidates.  As reductions 
in public funding bite harder, it is sensible to assume that the need for senior 
leaders with financial and commercial acumen increases. 
 
• Our views concur with the advice from the evaluations undertaken to date 
(and outlined in Section 1) – the success of a model is in the detail of its 
implementation. Once a decision to change has been made, the 
implementation process should be undertaken as quickly as possible.  
However, this stage needs to be well-planned, carefully executed, rigorously 
monitored, and underpinned by timely and accurate data about performance 
from Day 1.  Following the technical merger, leaders need to be highly visible 
to their new teams, focused on delivering the planned benefits, and should 
avoid external distractions which do not have a direct impact on the institution 
and its performance. 
 
• Our assessment of success suggest that new collaborations and new 
structures, where the decision to change has been subject to rigorous 
assessment and careful implementation, can create valuable economies of 
scale, protect and improve student access and progression, and address 
issues of poor quality.  There is much good practice in the sector about how 
to ensure that these important features are realised, and a willingness by 
those visited and consulted during the course of this work to share their views 
and experiences with others.  
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REPORT APPENDIX 
1. Key areas for discussion with sector consultees 
 
2. Providers visited by FE Advisers 
 
3. BIS and other sector stakeholders consulted 
 
4. Comparative success rates against national averages 
 
5. The merger diary (these tables are provided to set the 
context of the merged colleges in England which we 
visited in the course of this study). 
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KEY AREAS FOR DISCUSSION WITH SECTOR CONSULTEES 
AND DURING VISITS TO INSTITUTIONS: 
1. What were the key drivers for collaboration/merger at the time?  
 
2. Were other models, approaches to collaboration or partners considered, and 
with hindsight, to what extent might each have worked?  
 
3. How was the decision to merge/collaborate taken and by whom?  How did the 
approvals process work?  
 
4. What were the actual costs of planning and ultimately implementing the 
collaboration (particularly in terms of external support).   
 
5. How long did the process of merger/collaboration take and what were the 
short term impacts, difficulties and consequences for students, staff, 
reputation and college finances as you went through the process? 
 
6. What arrangements were put in place for governance How effective has 
governance and accountability been? 
 
7. In practice, what has been the impact (positive and negative) on  
 
• Quality of provision (success rates, destinations, VA, pace of 
improvement in processes) 
• Identifying and implementing efficiency savings. 
• The breadth of the curriculum offer (particularly vocational and sectors 
meeting local employer needs - sector subjects and specialisms) 
• Employer-focused work, and the colleges’ ability to expand its 
apprenticeship programmes (traineeships) and profit-making courses 
• opportunities for delivery in other ‘markets’ (14-16, DWP, international, 
HE,) – if relevant 
• work with the community and with local stakeholders including the LEP 
and local authorities? 
• Reputation and influence? 
• Other providers? 
 
8. Has collaboration/merger helped improve longer-term financial stability, levels 
of capital investment and/or economies of scale? 
 
9. How has the political and economic environment changed since the 
collaboration/merger – how has this impacted on plans?  
 
10. Were there any legislative or policy barriers which prevented or limited 
consideration of particular collaborative options? 
 
11. What would be your key ‘messages’ for others embarking on exploring and 
introducing new models of collaboration of this type? 
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PROVIDERS VISITED BY FE ADVISERS 
A Established merged colleges 
Hull College Group 
The Manchester College 
Leeds City College 
Birmingham Metropolitan College 
South Gloucestershire and Stroud College 
Cornwall College 
Barnet and Southgate College 
 
B Colleges in Scotland/Wales 
Gwent College 
Merthyr Tydfil College 
Forth Valley College 
 
C Federations 
Reigate College and Coulsdon College  
North Warwickshire and Hinckley College/South Leicestershire College 
Kingston College, Carshalton College 
 
D Alternative collaborations and structures 
The London Apprenticeship Company 
Eastleigh College 
Prospects College 
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E Shared Services 
FE Sussex (Shared Services in Sussex and Surrey) 
Wessex Shared Services (Bournemouth and Poole College and Brockenhurst 
Shared Services) 
 
BIS AND OTHER SECTOR STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTED 
Julian Gravatt (AoC) 
Lynne Sedgemore (157 Group) 
Stewart Segal (AELP) 
Bob Powell (Holex) 
Karen Murray (EFA) 
Debbie Watson (SFA) 
Marina Gaze (Ofsted) 
Paul McKean (JISC) 
Scottish Government (Melanie Weldon, Colin Baird, and colleagues from the Scottish 
Funding Council) 
Welsh Government (Andrew Clark, Jane Ellis, Edwyn Williams) 
BIS (Jacqui Entwistle, Steve Robinson and colleagues) 
NI Government (Andy Cole and colleagues) 
With additional material from the following organisations (as a result of 
discussions with sector stakeholders): 
Newcastle College 
Plymouth College of Art and Design (Andrew Bretherton) 
Aylesbury College (Karen Mitchell) 
Bromley College (Sam Parrett) 
Calderdale College (Chris Jones) 
3AAA (Peter Marples and Di McEvoy Robinson) 
HIT Training (Jill Whitaker) 
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Kaplan (Tim Burrows) 
Learn Direct (Roger Peace) 
The College of Estate Management (Ashley Wheaton) 
Realise Futures (Sally Butcher) 
LA adult learning Bournemouth, Dorset and Poole (Lesley Spain) 
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Success rates of other collaborative partnerships visited - all 
ages, all length - against national averages 
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Success rates of larger merged colleges visited - all ages, all 
length - against the national average 
Barnet and Southgate
College
Birmingham
Metropolitan College
Bromley College
Cornwall College
Hull College Group
Leeds City College
The Manchester College
Newcastle College Group
National average
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      College mergers under the 
FEFC (1993-2001) 
     Colleges Name of merged 
institution 
Type of 
merger 
Operative date 
  St Austell Sixth Form 
College and Mid-Cornwall 
College 
St Austell College Double 
dissolution 
02-Apr-93 
  Hinckley College and 
North Warwickshire 
College for Technology 
and Art 
North Warwickshire and 
Hinckley College 
Double 
dissolution 
01-Mar-96 
  Airedale and Wharfedale 
College and Park Lane 
College 
Park Lane College Single 
dissolution 
(A&WC) 
01-Aug-98 
  Barnet College and 
Hendon College 
Barnet College Single 
dissolution 
(Hendon 
College) 
01-Aug-00 
  Kingsway College and 
Westminster College 
Westminster Kingsway 
College 
Single 
dissolution 
(KC) 
01-Sep-00 
     College mergers under the 
LSC (2001-2010) 
     Colleges Name of merged 
institution 
Type of 
merger 
Operative date 
  St Austell College and 
Cornwall College 
Cornwall College Single 
dissolution (St 
Austell) 01-Aug-01 
  Shena Simon College and 
City College, Manchester 
City College, Manchester 
Single 
dissolution 
(SSC) 01-Sep-01 
  North Birmingham College 
and Sutton Coldfield 
College Sutton Coldfield College 
Single 
dissolution 
(TTC) 01-Apr-03 
  Josiah Mason Sixth Form 
College and Sutton 
Coldfield College  
Sutton Coldfield College Single 
Dissolution 
01-Aug-06 
  Keighley College and Park 
Lane College  
Park Lane College 
Keighley 
Single 
Dissolution 
01-Aug-07 
  Newcastle College and 
Skelmersdale & Ormskirk 
College 
Newcastle College Single 
Dissolution 
01-Aug-07 
 
   
  Manchester College of 
Arts and Technology 
(Mancat) and City College 
Manchester Manchester College 
Double 
dissolution 
01-Aug-08 
  Leeds College of 
Technology, Park Lane 
College and Leeds 
Thomas Danby Leeds City College 
Triple 
dissolution 
01-Apr-09 
  Sutton Coldfield College 
and Matthew Boulton 
College  
Birmingham Metropolitan 
College 
Single 
Dissolution 
01-Aug-09 
 
  
 
  
College mergers under the 
SFA/YPLA/EFA  (2010-) 
 
 
   Bromley College and 
Orpington College 
Bromley College of 
Further and Higher 
Education 
Single 
Dissolution 
01-Aug-11 
  Leeds City College and 
Joseph Priestley College Leeds City College 
Single 
Dissolution 
01-Aug-11 
  Barnet College and 
Southgate College 
Barnet and Southgate 
College 
Single 
Dissolution 01-Nov-11 
  Stroud College and Filton 
College 
South Gloucestershire 
and Stroud College 
Double 
Dissolution 
Incorporation 04-
01-12, 
Dissolution 01-02-
12 
  Birmingham Metropolitan 
College and Stourbridge 
College 
Birmingham Metropolitan 
College 
  31-May-13 
  Kidderminster College 
(WM region) and 
Newcastle College Group 
(NCG) 
NCG   01-Aug-14 
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     HE/FE mergers in the LSC 
period (2001-2010) 
     College Assets transferred to Operative 
date 
   Harrogate College  
(part of Leeds Met - 
FE/HE mergers in the 
FEFC period 1993-2001) 
Hull College 01-Aug-08 
     Note: adapted from material provided by AoC. 
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